Edwin Wiley (1952)  

Among the many unusual characters populating the Law School faculty
in 1949, one who stands out vividly in my memory is our first-year Property
Professor, Sheldon Tefft, a Nebraska native who, I believe, was among the
first Americans to receive a law degree from Oxford. Sheldon's overbearing
manner and stentorian speech (in a faux Oxford accent strongly colored by
Midwestern overtones) terrorized our 1L class mainly comprised of WWII
veterans--one could detect a quaver in virtually every response to his
intense Socratic questioning. Indeed, even an ego as stalwart as that of
George Steiner (now a Cambridge don and renowned critic) who audited several
of Sheldon's classes while seeking a Rhodes scholarship, acknowledged being
cowed in that classroom atmosphere. Notwithstanding widespread rumors that
Professor Tefft believed the Anglo-American law of property had reached it
culmination with enactment of the Statute de Donis, he effectively instilled
in us the fundamentals of 19th century real estate practice. [ However,
most of us thought it advisable in our third year to take the course
entitled "Modern Real Property" offered by Allison Dunham, who had recently
relocated from Columbia.] What a surprise to discover Sheldon's true
character upon visiting the School a few years later--he had become a "Teddy
Bear", conveying to this graduate great personal warmth and genuine interest
in the development of our professional careers matched only by another dear
mentor, Bernie Meltzer. Perhaps Sheldon was preparing us for future
encounters with courtroom autocrats.

In a more serious vein were some extraordinary decisions which
confronted the editors of the Law Review in my third year. I am particularly
proud of our having published the now famous article by Professors Kalven
and Blum entitled "The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation", a seminal
essay on tax equity which has been cited extensively and reprinted several
times in the intervening years. What made this decision difficult was not
the quality of the work, but rather its virtually exclusive reliance on
economic and philosophical considerations as distinguished from legal
precedents and authorities-- an approach foreign to the law review
traditions of the time--as well as its sheer length, which required
dedicating the entire articles section of the issue [number 3, Spring 1952]
to this single work.

Also noteworthy were two decisions by the Review's editorial board
to reject certain unsolicited manuscripts: (1) a defense by alumnus George
Anastaplo of his refusal to answer whether he was a member of an
organization advocating violent overthrow of the government which had
resulted in denial to him of a license to practice law in Illinois and (2)
an article on antitrust law by then Dean Edward Levi. The former became
something of a cause celebre, particularly among members of the immediately
preceding editorial board who had been Anastaplo's classmates and were not
reluctant to share their favorable opinions with us. Moreover, we were
subjected to considerable lobbying both for and against publication by
esteemed members of the faculty. Notwithstanding these efforts to intrude
on our editorial independence, Anastaplo was advised that his article would
not be published without extensive re-writing, beyond even our rather
presumptuous editorial prerogative, which the author refused to do. A
similar decision was communicated to Dean Levi who responded with
characteristic taciturnity, promptly submitting his manuscript to
Northwestern Law Review where it was published without revision.